Abstract. Dimensional safety policy checking is an old topic in software analysis concerned with ensuring that programs do not violate basic principles of units of measurement. Scientific and/or navigation software is routinely dimensional and violations of measurement unit safety policies can hide significant domain-specific errors which are hard or impossible to find otherwise. Dimensional analysis of programs written in conventional programming languages is addressed in this paper. We draw general design principles for dimensional analysis tools and then discuss our prototypes, implemented by rewriting, which include both dynamic and static checkers. Our approach is based on assume/assert annotations of code which are properly interpreted by our tools and ignored by standard compilers/interpreters. The output of our prototypes consists of warnings that list those expressions violating the unit safety policy. These prototypes are implemented in the rewriting system Maude.
Introduction
Checking software for measurement unit consistency, also known as dimensional analysis, is an old topic in software analysis. Software developed for scientific domains, such as physics, mechanics, mathematics or applications of those, often involves units of measurement despite the lack of support provided by underlying programming languages. Computations using entities having attached physical units can be quite complex; detecting dimensional inconsistencies in such computations, for example adding or comparing meters and seconds, can reveal deep domain-specific errors which can be hard, if not impossible, to find by just analyzing programs within their language's semantics, automatically or not.
To emphasize the importance and nontrivial nature of dimensional analysis, we recall two notorious real-life failures. NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft crashed into Mars' atmosphere on 30 September 1999 due to a software navigation error; peer review findings indicate that one team used English units (e.g., inches, feet) while the other used metric units for a key spacecraft operation [24] . On 19 June 1985 , the space shuttle Discovery flew upside down over Maui during an experiment, in an attempt to point the mirror to a spot 10,023 nautical miles above see level; that number was supplied in units of feet and then fed into the onboard guidance system, which unfortunately was expecting units in nautical miles, not feet [22] . These two failures, as well as many other lower magnitude ones, could have been avoided by using dimensional analysis tools.
There is much work on supporting measurement units in programming languages. The earliest mention of the idea of incorporating units in programming languages, to our knowledge was in 1960 [5] . Karr and Loveman [17] suggested a mechanism that allowed units to occur in programs. There have been proposals for dimensional checking within existing languages like Pascal [9, 10] and Ada [11] , and even in formal specification of software [14] . An intuitive approach to strengthen type checking in programming languages was also suggested in [16] . The Mission Data System (MDS) team at NASA JPL developed a C++ library incorporating hundres of classes representing typical units, like MeterSecond, together with appropriate methods to replace the arithmetic operators when measurement unit objects are involved. These techniques based on type checking, in addition to adding runtime overhead due to additional method calls (which can admittedly be minimized by optimized compilers), cause inconvenience to programmers and make the development of reusable software difficult. Furthermore, they limit the class of allowable (or type checkable) programs to an unacceptably low level. For example, a program calculating the geometric mean of the elements in a vector of meters needs a temporary variable which is multiplied incrementally by each element in the array; the unit of this temporary variable changes at each iteration, so it cannot be declared using any fixed type. The solution adopted by MDS is to remove and attach types to numerical values via appropriate extractors and constructors, which, of course, is a safety leak.
Packages for dimensional analysis and integrity in Ada have been proposed in [15, 20] , employing the use of Ada's abstraction facilities, such as operator overloading and type parameterization. Using a discipline of polymorphic programming, it was suggested in [21] that type checking can and should be supported by semantic proof and theory. This was extended in [23] using explicit type scheme annotations and type declarations and in [27] for type-indexed values in ML-like languages. The approach in [25] associated numeric types with polymorphic dimension parameters, avoiding dimension errors and unit errors. Kennedy proposed a formally verified method to incorporate, infer and check dimension types in ML-style languages [19] , and provided a parametricity theorem saying that the behavior of programs is independent of the units used [18] .
All the above study based on extensions, sometimes quite heavy, of programming languages, builds a foundation for languages equipped with dimensional information. However, due to practical, economical and/or taste reasons, these approaches have not been accepted by mainstream programmers and have not been widely used in applications. For instance, it is exceedingly inconvenient for programmers to rewrite a whole large application in another language -the one extended with unit types -just to avoid measurement unit conflicts. In this paper we propose a lighter-weight, rewriting-based approach to check measurement unit consistency, which has the main advantage that it does not modify the underlying programming language at all. The user interacts with our tools via code annotations, which are just comments, and via safety policy violation warning reports. We provide an integrated tool containing both dynamic and static checkers implemented by rewriting in Maude, and explain their trade-offs.
We mainly focus on examples and general concepts here, mentioning that our Maude rewriting implementation has more than 2,000 rewriting rules. One can find more information (including complete source code) and download our tools, at http://fsl.cs.uiuc.edu. The work presented in this paper has been started by the second author as a former researcher at NASA.
In this section we recall the basics of the BC and Maude languages. BC is the language on which we applied our measurement unit safety checking approach presented in this paper, but an implementation targeting C is under current development and one targeting Java is under design. Maude is a rewriting based executable specification language that we used to implement our prototypes. BC. Our domain-specific safety checking approach is general, both with respect to the domain of interest and with respect to the underlying programming language, but we firstly applied it to the GNU BC language, which comes with any Unix platform [1] , because it is a simple but still practical language having most of the characteristics of current imperative languages. BC [1] is an arbitrary precision calculator language, typically used for mathematical and scientific computation. The most basic element in BC is the number. BC has only two types of variables, simple variables and arrays, which are used to store numbers. The syntax of expressions and statements in BC is very similar to that of C. It includes all the arithmetic, logical and relational operators found in C, in addition to the increment "++" and decrement "--" operators, and it also allows control structures for branching and looping through constructs like if, for and while. Comments start with the characters /* and end with */. BC programs are executed as the code is read, on a line by line basis; multiple instructions on a single line are allowed if separated by semicolon. It allows auto variables in functions, which are intended as variables for local usage; however, they are distinguished from the traditional local variables, their active range being extended over those functions called by the function in which they are defined, thus giving BC a dynamic scoping language flavor. By pushing auto variables and parameters of functions into stack dynamically, BC supports recursive functions. One can type man bc on any UNIX platform for more information on GNU BC. For some unexplained reason, only one-character identifiers are allowed by the BC implementation on Sun platforms; therefore we recommend the readers interested in experimenting with large examples to use the Linux version of BC. Maude. Maude [6] is a high performance rewriting-based specification and verification system in the OBJ family [13] . We use Maude to specify BC along with its executable semantics and its domain-specific operational semantics w.r.t units of measurements. The following is a Maude module implemented in our unit safety analysis tool, defining a segment of the theory of units of measurement:
fmod UNITS is protecting INT .
sorts BUnit SpecialUnit Unit UnitList . subsorts BUnit SpecialUnit < Unit < UnitList . eq Newton = kg meter second^-2 . eq U noUnit = U . eq U any = U . eq U fail = fail . eq fail^N = fail . eq any^N = any . eq noUnit^N = noUnit . eq U^1 = U . eq U U = U^2 . ceq U^0 = noUnit if ((U =/= fail) and (U =/= any)) . eq U (U^N) = U^(N + 1) .
eq (U^N) (U^M) = U^(N + M) . eq (U U')^N = (U^N) (U'^N) . eq (U^N)^M = U^(N * M) . endfm
We assume the reader familiar with Maude. In the above module, we have different types (sorts) of data: BUnit for basic units, SpecialUnit, Unit and UnitList.
Units like mile and noUnit have been declared as constants of sorts BUnit and SpecialUnit, respectively. The intuition for the special units is that they can be used in any unit context but can be distinguished from the basic units. The unit any is a unit which can be dynamically converted to any other unit, depending on the context; for example, in a BC statement like x++, the increment 1 is of unit any and is dynamically converted to the current unit associated to the variable x. The special unit noUnit is used to distinguish a cancelled unit (for example after calculating meter^(1-1)) from the unit any, in order to report appropriate warnings, and the special unit fail is attached to a variable in case its unit cannot be computed due to safety violations, such as, the unit of z after executing z = x + y in an environment in which x has the unit meter while y has the unit second. We claim, without proof, that the specification above is confluent and terminating, so it can be used as a computational model for unit equivalences.
Executable Semantics of Programming Languages
Equational logic is an important paradigm in computer science. It admits complete deduction and is efficiently mechanizable by rewriting: CafeOBJ [8] , Maude [6] and Elan [3] are equational specification and verification systems in the OBJ [13] family that can perform millions and tens of millions of rewrites per second on standard PC platforms. It is expressive: Bergstra and Tucker [2] showed that any computable data type can be characterized by means of a finite equational specification, and Goguen and Malcolm [12] , Wand [26] , Broy, Wirsing and Pepper [4] , and many others showed that equational logic is essentially strong enough to easily describe virtually all traditional programming language features.
Following the example in [12] , we have defined the semantics of BC as an equational algebraic specification. Our BC specification has about 500 equations in Maude, all unconditional. Thanks to Maude's speed in executing unconditional equational specifications, we were able to run dozens of non-trivial, often recursive BC programs, directly within their semantics in Maude. The overall reduction in speed was a factor of about 25-30, which we found satisfactory for our prototypes, which essentially extend the executable semantics of BC with new, domain-specific definitions for safety policies.
Briefly, the executable semantics of BC declares an operation run which takes a program and a list of integers (its input) and returns another list of integers (its output). To execute programs properly, one needs to also define environments, which are sets of pairs (variable, integer). Because of recursive function calls, one needs to also stack these environments dynamically, as the program executes. Appropriate operations to update the environment are also defined, as well as operations to properly deal with return, break and continue statements.
Design Conventions and Annotation Schemas
The design of our prototypes has been influenced by three major factors: correctness, unchanged native programming language, and low amount of annotations. Correctness. "Correctness" means that all violations of safety policy will be reported. We consider correctness a crucial aspect because, unlike other tools like ESC [7] intended to help users find many bugs with relatively little effort, our tools are intended to be used on safety critical software, such as air craft and navigation, where software developers want to be aware of any inconsistency.
Unmodified Programming Language. Another major influencing factor in our design was the decision to not modify the underlying programming language at all, for example by adding new types. Our reason for this decision is multiple. First, we do not want to worry about providing domain specific compilers; one can just use the state of the art optimized compilers for the specific programming language under consideration. Second, by enforcing an auxiliary typing policy on top of a programming language in order to detect unit inconsistencies via type checking, one should pay the price of some runtime overhead due to method calls that will replace all the normal arithmetic operators; our static prototype does not add any runtime overhead. Third and perhaps most importantly, since we do not add new types to the language, we do not put the user in the unfortunate situation to have a correct program rejected because it cannot be type checked, which is in our view the major drawback of typed approaches to unit safety; instead, our user has the option to either add auxiliary unit specific information to help the checker or to ignore some of the warning messages. Annotation Schemas. The mechanism by which users can add auxiliary, in this case measurement unit specific, information to program is via annotations, which are special comments at appropriate places in the program. Annotations are introduced with the syntax /*U _ U*/, which is understood by our tools and ignored by compilers, and are of two kinds: assumptions and assertions. Our annotation schemas are general and can be applied to any domain-specific safety policy checker, but in this paper we will focus on unit safety policy.
We now present an example showing some of the complex unit expressions that can be manipulated by our tool, and also emphasizing the importance of annotations. The program below provides functions to calculate distances, convert energy and calculate the angle under which a projectile of a given weight should be launched in order to travel a given distance: define sqrtnaive(x) { auto temp; temp = 0; /*U assume unit(temp) = sqrt(unit(x)) U*/ while(1) {if (temp*temp>=x) return temp; if (temp*temp>x) return temp-1; temp += 1;} } define lb2kg(w) /*U assert unit(w)=lb U*/ /*U assume returns kg U*/ {return 10 * w / 22;} define distance(x1, y1, x2, y2) {return sqrtnaive((x2-x1)^2 + (y2-y1)^2);} define energy2speed(energy,weight) {return sqrtnaive(2 * energy / weight);} define prjTangent(dist, speed, g) /*U assert unit(speed)^2 = unit(dist) unit(g) U*/ { auto dx, dy; dx = speed*speed + sqrtnaive(speed^4 -(dist*g)^2); dy=dist*g; return dx/dy} projectilex = 0; /*U assume unit(projectilex) = meter U*/ projectiley = 0; /*U assume unit(projectiley) = unit(projectilex) U*/ targetx = 17; /*U assume unit(targetx) = unit(projectilex) U*/ targety = 21; /*U assume unit(targety) = unit(projectiley) U*/ dist = distance(projectilex, projectiley, targetx, targety); projectileweight = 5; /*U assume unit(projectileweight) = lb U*/ energy = 2560; /*U assume unit(energy) = kg meter^2 second^-2 U*/ speed = energy2speed(energy, projectileweight); g = 10;
/*U assume unit(g) = meter second^-2 U*/ print(prjTangent(dist, speed, g));
The first function is the naive implementation of square root and the second one is a converting routine, from lb to Kg. The next function computes the distance between two points. No annotations are given, but a warning will be generated anyway if the arguments do not have the same unit. The fourth function computes the speed of an object, given the energy acting on it. The last function computes the tangent of the angle of a projectile, given a certain distance it wants to reach, an initial speed and a gravitational acceleration. This function is annotated with an assertion describing a unit invariant among its arguments. This allows one to use such functions in various contexts, such as under metric or English system conventions, as well as for other possible combinations of units. One can now assume a context in which these functions are called. The above code contains a unit safety violation, which is immediately reported by both checkers. The error will be reported when the function projectileTangentAngle is called, because the unit of speed is Kg^(1/2) meter second^-1 lb^(-1/2) so the assertion of function projectileTangentAngle will be violated. To correct this problem, the user should first properly convert the projectile weight to Kg, so the speed should be assigned the expression energy2speed(energy, lb2kg(projectileWeight)). Reducing the Amount of Annotations. Influenced by the observed and sometimes openly declared reluctance of ordinary programmers and software engineers to modify or insert annotations in their programs, we paid special attention to reducing the amount of annotations to a minimum possible. As a consequence, every variable by default is considered to have its own unit, which is different from any other existing unit. This principle of course extends to auto variables, their units being considered different from the units of global variables having the same name. Our tool will therefore output a warning on the simple program print(x+y), because x and y cannot be shown to have the same unit.
This brings us to a major design convention of our tool, called the locality principle, which assumes that the user understands what (s)he is doing locally, within a single instruction, with respect to constants. For example, if one writes x++, then one means to increase the value of x by 1, and this 1 has exactly the same unit as x. The same increment instruction can be reached several times during the execution of the program; each time the unit of the increment will be dynamically converted to the unit of x, which can be different each time. There is no difference between the statements x++ and x = x + 1, so we apply the same locality principle to numerical constants. That implies that in x = x + 5, the unit of 5 will be converted to the unit of x and no warning will be reported. Additionally, a constant assignment to a variable, such as x = 5, will not change the unit of x. Our motivation for these conventions is again to keep the amount of code annotation low, but the users thinking that our locality principle yields a safety leak have the option to always attach a unit to numerical values via appropriate assumptions, e.g., temp = 5 ; /*U assume unit(temp) = second U*/, and then execute x = x + temp; a warning will be reported in this case if the unit of x cannot be shown to be second. Based on these efforts, the following example of sorting needs only one assumption to satisfy the safety policy: The only assumption needed, assigning the universal unit any to the counter i, guarantees the compatibility of i and n when they are compared later, within the loop conditions. The first loop, which assigns decreasing numbers to the elements of the array a, also assigns the unit of n, which is considered to be a fresh unit different from any other unit because no unit has been explicitly assigned to it, to each of the 25 elements of a. In the case of the static analyzer, the array a will be assigned the unit of n by executing the loop body symbolically only twice, regardless of the value of n (because the environment set stabilizes; see Subsection 5). Then the second loop is analyzed and no warning is reported because the nested loop assigns the unit of i, which is any, to j, so any subsequent comparisons of j are safe; the environment set also stabilizes in two iterations of the loop. Similarly the third loop can be certified without any auxiliary information. Without the assumption, 5 warnings would be reported.
Rule-based Dynamic and Static Analysis Tool
The current version of our tool supports only the BC language, but it is being extended to support C and Java (see http://fsl.cs.uiuc.edu). Tool Development. The tool is invoked with the command "bc-unit [-so] filename" where s and o are optional. By default, the tool starts its dynamic checker, which is described below, and its output consists of a list of warnings reported in the order of execution. A warning consists of the line number and the expression violating safety; the same warning can appear many times if the unsafe expression has been executed more than once. The option "-o" tells the tool to output the warning list ordered by line numbers without redundancy. The option "-s" triggers the static checking mode .
We used Maude as a rule-based programming language to implement both the dynamic and the static checkers. Since programs to be analyzed are expected to be provided as terms to Maude, we have implemented a simple wrapper (about 300 lines of PERL code), whose work-flow is the following:
1. Adjust the input program to be parsable by Maude, e.g., add spaces around BC symbols, add line numbers, delete unnecessary comments, detect the variable and function names and define them as appropriate constants, etc.; 2. Invoke either the dynamic or the static Maude checker (which are described below) to verify the generated program term; 3. Collect Maude's output, parse it and produce user friendly error messages. This way users can use our tool in a push-button fashion, without seeing Maude. Dynamic Checker. Our Maude dynamic unit safety checker interprets the BC program within its executable semantics enriched with the unit safety policy. This is realized by extending the executable semantics specification of BC discussed in Section 3. A major extension is with respect to execution environments. An execution environment is now a set of triples, each triple containing a variable, an integer value and a unit of measurement. The integer value is used to determine the execution flow of the analyzed program, while the unit is used to check the safety policy. For example, if the expression x + y is encountered at line number 15 and the execution environment contains the triples [x, 7, meter^2 second] and [y, 3, meter second] then the value 10 is correctly assigned to the sum of x and y but a warning message will be issued of the form 15 : x + y. If the expression x + y was assigned to a variable, say x, then the new environment will assign the value 10 and the unit fail to the variable x. Since BC supports recursive function calls and auto variables, all the environment stacking technique needs to be extended to the enriched environments.
Another major extension of the BC semantics is with respect to the newly introduced code annotations, which act like new, domain-specific instructions. An assumption /*U assume unit(Var) = UnitExp U*/ is interpreted by our dynamic checker as follows: 1) first evaluate the unit expression UnitExp in the current environment, hereby obtaining a result which is an expression using just basic units, then 2) modify the current environment by associating the newly calculated unit to the variable Var, without changing its current integer value; if UnitExp fails to evaluate to a correct unit, due to violations of the safety policy, then the unit fail will be assigned to Var. Due to its precision in analysis because of the exact execution path and environment, the dynamic checker can allow the user to assign different units to different elements in an array. In fact, any abstract memory location can have any unit associated with it. Assumptions /*U assume returns UnitExp U*/ are interpreted as follows: when a function call is invoked in an expression context, UnitExp is evaluated and returned as unit associated to the function call; the function call will also take place, and all additional warnings while executing the function are collected and reported. Assertions of boolean unit expressions are simply evaluated to boolean values and warnings are returned if they evaluate to false. Static Checker. The main idea behind our static unit analyzer is that the concrete execution path of the program to be checked is entirely ignored; instead, all executions are considered in parallel. An immediate assumption is to also ignore all the numerical values and only consider the domain-specific, abstract values (units of measurement) of variables. Therefore, environments will now consist of pairs (variable, unit). Since the concrete indexes in arrays are not available anymore, it assumes that, unlike its dynamic version, all the elements in an array have the same unit. Due to the loss of precision, at each point in the program one has to consider a set of environments, namely all those in which a potential execution of the program can be. Each statement will be abstractly evaluated in all the environments. If the unit safety policy is violated in any of the environments then a warning will be output. A new set of environments will be computed after each statement. The treatment of loops is non-trivial. A general solution would involve loop invariants, which we would like to avoid as much as possible due to its lack of understanding by ordinary programmers and software engineers. Our alternative solution is based on code patterns. More precisely, we define loop patterns that we can efficiently analyze statically. One such pattern is a loop whose body, when symbolically executed under a set of possible environments, does not change that set of environments; if this is the case then the loop can be safely ignored. Another pattern is one which symbolically executes the loop until the set of environments stabilizes; this pattern for example is triggered in order to analyze the sorting algorithm in Subsection 4. If a certain loop does not fall under any of the provided patterns, then all the defined variables in the loop are invalidated (their unit is set to fail) and the static analysis process continues. The user can intervene and attach proper units to failed variables. The advanced user can add new patterns. Some Experiments. In most of our experiments the Maude executable definition of BC was about 25-30 times slower than BC v1.06 on Linux platforms, which is a good factor considering that we build our tools directly on top of a mathematically clean setting. Adding measurement unit knowledge to the BC specification basically doubles its size and further increases the execution time of programs by a factor of 5. Since many physics programs essentially calculate a function and have just one execution path, one can argue that having a precise dynamic measurement unit safety checker is extremely useful, even if it slows down the execution of the program by 2-3 orders of magnitude. The static checker needs more axioms because it implements several patterns for loops. If a loop falls under a known pattern then it is discarded quickly; otherwise, the user intervention may be needed to add new assumptions as annotations. The killing complexity factor for the static checker is conditional branches when these modify the unit-specific environment differently, which in our experience happens very rarely. We tried examples where 10 worst-case 10 line conditionals were serialized, for a total of 1024 situations to analyze, and it took our static checker about 3 seconds to check it. On the other hand, if the two branches generate the same abstract environment, that is, if they both modify the units of variables in the same way, then we were able to analyze 1,000 repetitions of best-case 10 line conditionals, so a total of 10,000 lines of BC code, in about 1 second.
Discussion. The main advantage of the dynamic checker is the precision of its reported warnings: any reported warning represents a violation of the unit safety policy. The user should therefore consider these reports very seriously and should have strong reasons to ignore them. The main drawback of the dynamic checker is its coverage: it only covers the path that was traversed by the particular execution of the program. Therefore, other errors might exist in the analyzed program which were not revealed and which can appear when the program is executed with different input. Another drawback of the dynamic unit safety checker is that its execution time consists of the analyzed program execution time plus the runtime overhead. Therefore, if a program calculates a computationally complex function or does not terminate in a reasonable time, then so does the unit safety prototype, which can be a serious drawback in some applications.
An advantage of the static checker is that it covers all the potentially reachable code. So it will not miss any unsafe expression. A careful and patient analysis of the reported warnings can lead one to find all the unit safety leaks. Another advantage is its relative efficiency, because it does not execute the programs, so non-termination of the program does not imply non-termination of the tool. However, depending on the amount of theorem proving that one wants to put in such a static certifier, it can actually become rather inefficient. A major drawback of the static certifier is the potentially long list of false alarms that it reports.
Conclusion and Future Work
A promising annotation based approach to dimensional safety has been presented, together with a tool including both dynamic and static safety checkers implemented by rewriting in Maude. Future work includes extending the pattern database for the static checker and designing a general purpose invariant based loop analysis technique to be launched as a last pattern.
